ABSTRACT: This paper aims at suggesting a simple prototype model that describes the complex dynamics of a sophisticated monetary economy. The interaction between the current and intertemporal financial constraints of economic units brings about irregular fluctuations at the micro and macro levels. By means of qualitative dynamic analysis and numerical simulations, we reformulate in more operational terms, and extend in a number of new directions, the model suggested recently by one of the authors (Vercelli, 2000) to study the interaction between financial fragility, modelled in terms of structural instability, and dynamically unstable financial fluctuations. JEL Classification: B41; E12; E32; E52
Introduction
In a sophisticated monetary economy the interaction between current and intertemporal financial constraints generates cyclical fluctuations characterised by dynamic instability. This has been pointed out by a prestigious and diversified tradition of thought including, among others, Wicksell (1898) , Irving Fisher (1933) , Keynes (1936) , and Minsky (1982) . What in our opinion has not been thoroughly analysed is the role of structural instability in this process. In this paper we intend to contribute to this analysis by interpreting the financial fragility of economic units not as an index of dynamic instability, as is usual in the literature mentioned above, but as an index of structural instability. In fact, the higher the degree of financial fragility the smaller the size of the shock that is sufficient to bring about a structural change in the behaviour of the unit.
1 For well known reasons (well analysed by Minsky, 1982) , the fragility of financial units fluctuates pro-cyclically with the financial fluctuations, increasing progressively in the boom phase the danger of a severe financial crisis. This raises an awkward dilemma for policy: when and how is it necessary to thwart the boom in order 1 We define a system as structurally unstable whenever in consequence of a small shock ε it changes the qualitative properties of its dynamic behaviour. We have introduced elsewhere (Vercelli 1991 and 2001) the distinction between structural instability in the strict sense of mathematics when the shock ε is infinitesimal, and ε-instability when the shock is small but finite. In the latter case ε measures the minimum size of a shock that brings about a qualitative change in the dynamic behaviour of the system. The concept of structural instability here utilised is that of ε-instability.
-2 -to avoid over-investment and an ensuing financial crisis? In order to answer this question it is crucial to understand the nature of the feedback between dynamic and structural financial instability.
To this end, we present a model that tries to capture in the simplest possible way the nexus between the financial fragility of economic units, conceived in terms of structural instability, and dynamically unstable financial fluctuations.
The approach here adopted is based on that suggested recently by one of the authors (Vercelli, 2000) . The original model was formalised in such a way as to render it intuitively understandable in economic terms, while the model here worked out is expressed in more operational terms in order to facilitate the application of standard mathematical techniques such as qualitative dynamic analysis and numerical methods.
We hope that in this version the approach may better reveal its constructive potential and act as a starting point for more complex and detailed analyses. To this end we have In Section 5 the main implications of the dynamic behaviour of the aggregate model are shown and interpreted by means of numerical simulations. In Section 6 a few policy implications of the aggregate model are discussed in some detail. In Section 7 some concluding remarks on the potential and the limits of the approach here outlined are briefly sketched.
Dynamic behaviour of the financial units
In this paper all decision makers are modelled as financial units. The rationale of this approach rests on the observation that the financial constraints and objectives of economic agents have assumed a crucial role in shaping their behaviour. This is a longrun process already pointed out, among others, by Wicksell (1898) and Keynes (1936) that has accelerated in the last two decades. The Financial Intensity Ratio of Goldsmith (FIR), i.e. the ratio between financial and real wealth, doubled in this period in the USA, UK, and France (where the FIR reached values between 2.1 and 2.9 %) and increased almost as much in Italy and Germany (where the FIR reached values between 1.3 and 1.4%) (Nardozzi, 2002, p. 15) . This trend has been observed not only in corporations but also in households. For example, the ratio of stocks on households wealth exceeded 55% in the U.K., 40% in the USA, 30% in France and Italy (ibidem, p.
17). The analysis of the financial determinants of economic behaviour is therefore becoming a general issue that should not be confined to financial corporations.
In this paper we want to focus in particular on the interaction between the decisions of financial units and their current and intertemporal financial constraints, without examining the details of their decision-making processes.
-4 -Each financial unit i is characterised in each period t by a certain amount of financial outflows e it in consequence of its purchases of goods and services, and financial inflows y it from the sale of its goods and services. The current financial ratio k it is then defined as the ratio between total financial outflows and total financial inflows realised by the financial unit i in a certain period:
When this ratio is greater than one, the financial unit reduces the current outflows or increases debt (i.e. the commitment to future outflows) or a mix of the two. This, in turn, affects the financial constraints faced by the unit in the future.
To take account of this, we consider, as the crucial variable that defines the financial robustness of the financial unit i, its intertemporal financial ratio, i.e., the ratio between the sum of discounted expected outflows and the sum of discounted expected inflows.
If r stands for the interest rate, Given this definition it follows that the condition for financial sustainability of the financial unit i is:
We may now define the financial fragility of a unit as its structural sensitivity to shocks (in the sense of ε-structural instability defined in footnote 1), whose degree is measured by the minimum shock that would jeopardize its solvency. In our case, therefore, the degree of financial fragility is measured by 1 * it k − . In this definition financial fragility defines the structural instability of the financial unit, i.e. the distance from the threshold that by definition changes the qualitative characteristics of its behaviour.
If we suppose that each unit defines a desired value of financial fragility (1−µ i ) beyond which it is reluctant to go, taking account of the risk of its financial position and its degree of risk aversion, we have that whenever 1 k < − µ , the financial unit tends to increase the size of its investment which implies an increase in k it .
Of course the larger is µ i the lower the probability of a shock of larger size jeopardizing its solvency. The choice of µ i is related to the degree of risk aversion. Risk lovers would choose a negative µ i (Ponzi finance) hoping in a positive shock, but we can assume that in general most financial units choose a µ i sufficiently big to be fairly safe.
The simple feedback mechanism between k it and * it k we have just described is captured by the following dynamical system:
where α, β > 0 for all i. k k k + = = in (1) and (2) -are the origin of the axes and P i = (1 − µ i , 1). In order to determine their nature, we consider the Jacobian matrix of the system, defined as:
at the origin, we obtain:
so that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in this case are always real and distinct and such that:
Thus, we can conclude that, for 0 < β < 2, the origin is a saddle point, whereas for β > 2 the origin is an unstable node. In Fig. 1(a) , for example, where α = β = 0.1 < 2, the origin of the axes proves to be a saddle point. have assumed the existence of shocks that intervene in the crucial definition of financial fragility, we do not need at this stage to make explicit their existence in the equations of the model. 3 All figures and simulations presented in the paper can be easily reproduced with simple MATLAB codes written by S. Sordi that are available upon request.
-7 -*** FIGURE 1(a),(b) HERE *** On the other hand, computing ( )
Thus, in this case, the characteristic equation is:
such that the eigenvalues are two complex conjugate numbers, greater than one in modulus:
We can then conclude that P i is an unstable focus (see Fig. 1 (a),(b)). As a consequence, in the region of validity of the linear approximation, the financial fluctuations resulting at the microeconomic level from the interaction between the current and intertemporal financial ratios are characterised by dynamic instability.
The dynamics of the financial unit: an alternative formulation
Before proceeding with our investigation, it is convenient to simplify the dynamical system (1)- (2) by expressing the feedback between the two variables k it and * it k in terms of first differences rather than growth rates. While preserving its basic economic contents, this simpler formulation will allow us to concentrate on the aggregate features of the model since, as will become apparent in the next section, it will simplify the derivation of the corresponding macroeconomic model.
Writing first differences rather than growth rates in the left-hand sides of both (1) and (2), the dynamical system becomes:
What we have obtained is a linear dynamical system which has, as a unique steady state, the positive equilibrium i P of the original model. Moreover, as in the original model, the latter proves to be an unstable focus.
4
Thanks to its simplicity, this alternative formulation of the feedback between the current and the intertemporal financial ratio is more suitable than the original one for investigating the consequences of further modifications and extensions of the model. To introduce one of these, let us notice that in (4), it is assumed that the financial unit adjusts its current financial ratio depending on the deviation of the intertemporal financial ratio from the desired level. As in the original model, moreover, it is assumed that the adjustment always takes place at a constant velocity, independently of how far the intertemporal financial ratio is from the desired level ( )
plausible, alternative is to assume that the adjustment of the current financial ratio takes 4 Indeed, if we write the homogenous system in matrix form, and we indicate the coefficient matrix with A, then we find that tr(A) = 2 and det(A) = 1 + αβ > 1. Thus, the discriminant of the characteristic equation is always negative and the two conjugate complex roots are always greater than one in modulus. See, for example, Lorenz (1993, p. 117 ).
-9 -place at a speed that does positively depend from the absolute value of the deviation of the intertemporal financial ratio from ( ) Inserting (5) in (4) we obtain the following modified version of the second equation of the dynamical system of our model:
As shown in Fig. 2 , this modification simply implies that, unlike in the previous case that is also drawn in the figure for comparison, the relation between the adjustment
k − − µ is now nonlinear: the more (the less) in absolute value the intertemporal financial ratio is away from its desired level, the more (the less), in proportion, the financial unit is willing to vary its current financial ratio. k − − µ , P i is still a steady state of the modified dynamical system (3)-(4′). Moreover, the right-hand side of (4′) is differentiable at P i and such that:
Thus, apart from the change in notation from α to α 0 , the nonlinear specification of the adjustment mechanism we have introduced has no effect on the Jacobian of the dynamical system at the steady state P i . As a consequence, the stability properties of the linear dynamical system (3)- (4) Of course, while a few financial units "die", others "are born". The "demography" of financial units would be very important to account for the actual dynamics of the economic system (Delli Gatti et al., 2003) . However, for the sake of simplicity, in this early stage of implementation of the model it is going to be completely neglected.
-12 -*** FIGURE 4(a),(b) HERE *** 4 The dynamical system for the entire economy
As we have already stressed, the formulation of the model with first differences of the variables in the left-hand side rather than growth rates, makes it much easier to aggregate the micro behaviour of financial units in order to represent the financial behaviour of the economy as a whole. Thus, it provides rigorous, though trivial, microfoundations to the analysis of macroeconomic behaviour and policy.
In fact the micro system represented by equations (3) and (4) is linear and therefore makes straightforward the calculations of the average values of the variables. In order to do that, let s denote the number of financial units operating in the economy. Then, summing over units, from (3)-(4), we obtain:
Finally, from (6) and (7), using K t and * t K to denote the average current and intertemporal financial ratios respectively, such that
we obtain for the entire economy:
We may show that the dynamical system (8)- (9) is a good approximation of the dynamical system for the entire economy even when the financial units follow a more sophisticated adjustment mechanism as in (3)-(4′). Indeed, the only difference is that, from (4′), summing over the s financial units, one obtains:
from which, on average:
Clearly, the more financial units operate close to their desired value of financial fragility and/or -of course -the smaller is α 1 , the closer the right-hand side of (9′) is to the right-hand side of (9). In what follows we assume that this is the case and we use equations (8) and (9) in order to study the dynamics of the entire economy.
Microeconomic financial fragility may now be defined as the size of the minimal shock that induces a financial unit to go bankrupt ( )
, while macroeconomic financial fragility may be defined as the size of the minimal shock that makes the economic dynamics unsustainable demanding immediate and drastic policy interventions in order to push the economy back into the sustainable area. 7 Under the pressure of competition and imitation, financial units are pushed to increase their financial exposure in order to maximise consumption and/or investment to the point where the marginal expected returns of further exposure equals the marginal risk premium. The risk is related to the probability that a shock may increase the -14 -In our aggregate model economy the system as a whole never enters the region with an intertemporal financial ratio greater than one since we have assumed that the financial units go bankrupt as soon as they hit their crucial barrier 1 + δ i and that the mean value of δ i is zero. This assumption forces us to reformulate the first of the two equations of the aggregate dynamical system. Indeed, the right-hand side of (8) is valid only if it is less than or equal to one. Otherwise, it is forced to be equal to one. To formalise this discontinuous dynamics of the average intertemporal financial ratio, we re-write equation (8) as:
or, in shorter notation:
which is a piecewise linear equation.
It is not difficult to understand that such a change, which is tantamount to considering a "ceiling" for the aggregate intertemporal financial ratio, has very important consequences for the dynamics of the system. 8 As shown in Figs. 5(a),(b), intertemporal financial ratio over the threshold 1 + δ i . The larger is µ i the lower the probability of a shock of larger size jeopardizing its solvency.
when we simulate the dynamical system (8′)-(9), the dynamically unstable fluctuations become persistent. *** FIGURE 5(a),(b) HERE ***
Implications for the overall financial aggregates of the economy
We intend now to analyse the implications of the dynamics of the current and intertemporal financial ratios for the financial aggregates of the entire economy. In order to do that, we notice that the aggregate outflows of the private sector of the economy at time t, which we denote by E t , are the sum of an endogenous component, The aggregate outflows E t translate into contemporaneous aggregate inflows Y t since, from the accounting point of view, the cash outflow of the buyer is identically equal to the cash inflow of the seller. On the contrary we may assume that there is a lag of one period between the realised inflows and the realised outflows of the financial units and 9 Taxation in its turn may be considered as the product of the aggregate inflows of the private sector multiplied by the average tax rate t: T t = tY t (see Fig. 6 ).
-16 -therefore of the corresponding aggregates (Vercelli 2000, p. 149 
where the dynamics of K t is determined by equations (8′) and (9).
This model may be interpreted as the financial counterpart of the simple Keynesian income-expenditure model underlying the multiplier (see Vercelli, 1991 and 2000) (Fig.   6 ).
*** FIGURE 6 HERE ***
The main difference, at the same time formal and substantial, is that in the simple Keynesian model, the slope of the aggregate demand line -given by the marginal propensity to consume -is fairly stable along the business cycle and it is very unlikely to be or become larger than one. As a consequence, the equilibrium of the model is dynamically stable. On the contrary, in the model we are now considering, the financial counterpart of a such a slope, given by the average current financial ratio, tends to oscillate pro-cyclically with the financial cycle and is very likely to become greater than one in the boom so making the system dynamically unstable in this phase. In addition, generally speaking, the shocks that impinge on the financial side of the economy are usually more frequent and larger than the real shocks. This comparison clarifies why the study of the financial side of the economy is so important if the purpose is to detect and control its intrinsic instability.
As we have already stressed, the dynamics of the model depends crucially on the policy regime. This may be clearly seen if we analyse and compare the dynamic behaviour of the system under the two above-mentioned regimes. First of all, by means of numerical simulations (represented graphically with the help of cobweb-type diagrams), we may show that in the inflationary regime, when the initial conditions are above equilibrium and K t < 1, we have a depression characterised by dynamic stability.
However the depression endogenously transforms itself in an expansion characterised by dynamic instability as a consequence of the progressive increase in K t triggered by the feedback mechanism between K t and * t K described by equation (8′) and (9). When the initial conditions are below equilibrium and initially K t < 1 we have an expansion characterised by dynamic stability which endogenously transforms itself into an expansion characterised by dynamic instability, with an increasing K t , until K t diminishes under the unity triggering a new depression.
The first iterations for the two cases with initial values of aggregate inflows respectively greater and smaller than the initial equilibrium level -and an initial average current financial ratio less than one, are shown in Fig. 7 . *** FIGURE 7 HERE *** However, this is not the end of the story as is clearly shown in the Figs. 8, 9, 10, and 11 where more iterations are considered. In the case depicted in Fig. 8 the dynamically stable expansion endogenously transforms itself in a boom characterised by dynamical instability. This happens also in the case of a dynamically stable recession that transforms itself in a recovery characterised by dynamic stability and, then, as soon as K t becomes greater than one, in a boom characterised by dynamic instability (see Fig.   9 ).
*** FIGURE 8 HERE *** *** FIGURE 9 HERE *** An aspect of the dynamics of the model economy worth stressing is that the transition from the recovery phase to the boom that we have just described is characterised by a radical structural change which modifies the dynamic characteristics of the system. As soon as K reaches a value greater than one, the equilibrium suddenly shifts to the South-West quadrant becoming unfeasible and at the same time dynamically unstable. On the basis of the feedback mechanisms considered in (8′) and (9), however, we know that in the boom both K and * K increase until * K reaches the "desired" level (1 − µ) after which K starts to decrease. As soon as K again becomes smaller than unity, the recovery may begin and the transition is once more characterised by an endogenous structural change such that the equilibrium again moves to the NorthEast quadrant and becomes dynamically stable. Given our representation in terms of a piecewise linear system, we know that the cyclical fluctuations of the current and intertemporal aggregate financial ratios start again along lines similar to those of the preceding cycle with the consequences for the overall financial aggregates of the economy shown in Figs. 10 and 11. In short, the persistence of the fluctuations in the average current and intertemporal financial ratios leads to very irregular fluctuations of the overall financial aggregates of the economy.
-19 -*** FIGURE 10 HERE *** *** FIGURE 11 HERE *** As for the "deflationary regime", it is important to stress that there is a crucial difference with respect to the case of "inflationary regime" so far analysed. The main difference is that in the case of a "deflationary regime" there is a serious risk that the system becomes trapped in a path of downward dynamical instability. In this case, as shown in Fig. 12 and, on a larger scale, in Fig. 13 , it may happen that -notwithstanding the progressive increase in K t , which, sooner or later, becomes greater than one -the economic system continues to deflate. *** FIGURE 12 HERE *** *** FIGURE 13 HERE *** This "deflationary trap" may be interpreted as a simple formal representation of the "debt-deflation" mechanism that, according to Irving Fisher (1933) , characterised the Great Depression of the 1930s and, according to Minsky (1982) , is typical of the most severe financial crises. In fact, in a deflationary regime a reduction of inflows of a financial unit is bound to induce a reduction of its outflows and so on. Only an injection of extra inflows in the form of more expenditure or more money from outside the private sector may reverse the vicious circle.
-20 -
The unstable dynamic behaviour of the economic system under the two policy regimes has policy implications that we intend to discuss in the next section.
Policy implications
The economic fluctuations described in the model worked out in the preceding sections tend to push at the end of the boom many financial units, and consequently the entire economy, into the area of pronounced financial fragility, i.e. very near the barrier of pathological structural change. In this situation a very small negative shock may be enough to bankrupt the most fragile financial units and to trigger a generalised financial crisis that may lead to a severe recession or even a depression. This situation typically occurs for each financial cycle of sizeable length and magnitude. The boom nurtures overoptimistic expectations and, at the same time, also generates further opportunities for expenditure, investment and growth.
In recent times pathological structural change was triggered, especially in the case of relatively weak units or sectors or economies, even when they were still relatively far from the crucial barrier of financial unsustainability. In fact an increasing propensity to herd behaviour favoured by the globalisation of capital markets and the ensuing massive and precipitous shifts of hot money from one firm or sector or country to another one may rapidly amplify a very small shock producing eventually a shock of magnitude sufficient to exceed the threshold of structural stability of the system.
In the model presented in this paper both dynamic instability and structural instability play a crucial role. The financial side of the market is seen as liable to dynamic instability and requires (dynamic) stabilisation interventions on the part of policy makers. Observed fluctuations, generally speaking, are unstable but not explosive because the fluctuations are constrained by a financial ceiling 10 beyond which the most fragile units go bankrupt. Fortunately often the inversion occurs before that limit precisely because policy, though it does not succeed in achieving the full dynamic stability of the system and may even help to provoke unintended fluctuations, is fairly successful in ensuring that the economy does not breach reasonable safety thresholds.
However what makes the control of the economy particularly difficult is the growing role assumed by structural instability in an increasingly sophisticated financial economy. As we have argued above very small shocks, rapidly amplified by herd behaviour, may induce the bankruptcy of many financial units as well as recession and depression for the economy as a whole.
These setbacks may be avoided through structural policy interventions that integrate the traditional counter-cyclical policies. The latter should intervene early in the boom as soon as a safe level of financial fragility is exceeded. These interventions should be cautiously "disinflationary" in the sense that they should reduce the positive value of E pu that characterizes the inflationary regime in order to check the progressive increase in financial fragility without being deflationary, i.e. without shifting the economy into a "deflationary regime". In addition this policy should, as far as possible, avoid increasing the rate of interest as this would augment the intertemporal financial ratio and therefore also the financial fragility of the units, particularly those more financially exposed. The space of manoeuvre for productive counter-cyclical policies is therefore extremely limited. Thus, it is crucial to intervene with structural measures that prevent an excessive increase in the financial fragility of economic units. This is done, e.g., in the financial sector by imposing a limit on the maximum ratio between liabilities and assets of banks. The recent agreement between supervision authorities of industrialised countries called "Basilea 2" aims to impose more rigour, although the crucial 10 Our model defines a sort of limit cycle beyond which the financial side of the economy cannot go.
-22 -importance of the relationship between financial fragility and financial fluctuations is dangerously played down in its current version.
In particular we should keep in mind that we have to avoid that an economy falls in a "deflationary trap". In this case, as we have seen in the precedent section only an injection of extra inflows in the form of more expenditure or more money from outside the private sector may reverse the vicious circle, provided that this injection is sufficient to shift the economy into the "inflationary" regime. In the 1930s the deflationary trap was triggered by the inadequate policy response to the Wall Street crash, a response that consisted in ill-judged deflationary measures. The industrial economies have learned from this experience and the teachings of Keynes how to react to financial crises characterised by insufficient aggregate demand. In this way they have avoided falling into a deflationary regime or switching from it to an inflationary regime in order to avoid or abort a "deflationary trap". However in recent times these acquisitions have been apparently questioned by approaches that give priority to monetary stability and balanced budgets and have a strong belief in the ability of the market to autoregulate itself. 11 Our model supports the idea that an economy fallen in a "deflationary trap" may be rescued only by public policy interventions aiming to shift the economy into en "inflationary" regime. However we have to stress that in logical terms a very moderate deficit spending and/or creation of money is sufficient to open the door of escape from the deflation trap. Their optimal amount depends on the cyclical and structural characteristics of the depression to be faced.
11 Stiglitz (2002) gives a list of examples with particular reference to the deflationary policies forced by the IMF on economies characterised by a lack of aggregate demand.
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Concluding remarks
The model here presented and discussed on the basis of a few simple numerical simulations of its dynamic behaviour is conceived as a first elementary illustration of an approach meant to analyse the interaction between dynamic and structural instability in a sophisticated financial economy. Financial fluctuations produced by the intrinsic dynamic instability of a globalised financial economy endogenously produce a change in the dynamic regime of the financial units that eventually brings about the bankruptcy of many of them and a generalised financial crisis often followed by a sharp downturn of the economy. The attempts by the managers of the financial units, and by policy makers, to avoid or abort a severe financial crisis may be frustrated by the high degree of financial fragility of the units and of the entire economy after a prolonged boom. In such a situation a very small shock, suddenly amplified by herd behaviour, may determine the bankruptcy of many financial units and a financial crisis of the entire economy. The usual counter-cyclical policies are insufficient for ensuring that such an outcome is avoided, as they have to be supplemented by, and coordinated with, structural policies aimed at preventing an excessive increase in financial fragility. The capital requirements and financial regulation performed by central banks are a case in point. However, after a prolonged boom, the financial fragility of the economy tends to increase at dangerous levels and a disinflationary policy becomes unavoidable. In the light of our model, however it is crucial that such a policy should not become deflationary since such a policy regime could lock the financial side of the economy into a "deflationary trap" from which it would be very difficult to escape.
Among the first steps necessary to develop this approach we mention: the introduction of financial stocks in the balance-sheets of the financial units; a more satisfactory process of aggregation based on the parameters that characterise the distribution of financial units rather than on the linear approximation here adopted; a more accurate modelling of the bankruptcy process; the analysis of the crucial role of -24 -the rate of interest in affecting both the dynamic and structural instability and their nexus, and an explicit analysis of the real consequences of the financial fluctuations. 
